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This chapter documents instances from past centuries where inventors freely shared knowledge of 
their innovations with other inventors. It is widely believed that such knowledge sharing is largely a 
recent development, as in open source software. Our survey shows, instead, that innovators have 
long practiced ―collective invention,‖ including in such key technologies as steam engines, iron and 
steel production and textile machinery. Generally, innovators‘ behavior was substantially richer 
than the heroic portrayal often found in textbooks and museums. Knowledge sharing sometimes 
coexisted with patenting, at other times, not, suggesting the importance of public policy that 
accommodates knowledge sharing to foster cumulative innovation. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
During the 1980s innovation scholars became increasingly aware of the importance of knowledge 
sharing as a fundamental ―source‖ of innovations. In one of the early studies of the phenomenon 
based on a large number of case studies of Irish, Spanish and Mexican firms, Allen et al. (1983) 
noted that, rather surprisingly, knowledge sharing of innovations was taking regularly place even 
among ―apparent competitors.‖ Subsequently, Eric von Hippel documented the existence of 
widespread and systematic knowledge sharing activities among competitors in a detailed case study 
of the US steel mini-mill industry, noting that plant managers routinely shared proprietary know-
how with competing firms (von Hippel, 1987, see also Schrader 1991). This was important because 
it not only diffused new techniques, but it also facilitated further, cumulative improvements. 
 
Yet von Hippel also recognized that this phenomenon might have deep historical roots, citing the 
historical study of Robert Allen (Allen, 1983). Allen, writing about the pig iron industry of 
Cleveland (UK) during 1850-1870, observed an instance of ―free exchange of information about 
new techniques and plant designs among firms in an industry‖ (Allen, 1983, p. 2). This exchange of 
knowledge facilitated innovations that built cumulatively on previous advances. Allen called this 
behavior ―collective invention.‖  
 
Nevertheless, it is still widely believed that knowledge sharing is mainly a modern development, 
perhaps related to the drastic reduction of costs for exchanging information brought about by 
advances in information and communication technologies. For example, Henry Chesbrough (2003, 
p. 24) describes today‘s ―Open Innovation‖ as a sharp break from the paradigm of the early 
twentieth century when R&D labs were largely self-sufficient, only occasionally receiving outside 
visitors, and when researchers would only occasionally venture out to visit universities or scientific 
expositions. Similarly, popular history books and museums often highlight the ―heroic inventor‖ 
with little attention to cooperation between innovators in the past.  
 
Interestingly enough, economic historian Joel Mokyr (2009), has recently pointed to the ―industrial 
enlightenment‖ as a critical pre-condition for the emergence and consolidation of the industrial 
revolution in the late eighteenth century. Mokyr‘s concept of industrial enlightenment refers to a 
knowledge revolution that progressively gained momentum during the eighteenth century. Two 
key-features of this knowledge revolution were: i) a drastic reduction in the costs of accessing 
extant bodies of knowledge (thanks to the expanding publication of scientific and technical books 
and journals); ii), a concerted attempt to create "a public sphere" for the fruitful interaction between 
scientific researchers and practitioners confronted with technical problems. Clearly, Mokyr‘s 
―industrial enlightenment‖ emphasizes the historical significance of knowledge sharing activities 
and, in particular, the establishment of formal and informal exchanges of information between 
―natural philosophers‖ and ―manufacturers‖. At the same time, however, Mokyr remains skeptical 
about the significance of knowledge sharing among inventors competing in the same industry, 
delivering this stark assessment:  
 
There are three reasonably well-documented cases of successful collective invention: the case 
documented by Allen (1983) of the Cleveland (UK) iron industry between 1850 and 1875, the case 
documented by MacLeod (1988, 112-113, 188) of the English clock and instrument makers; and the case 
documented by Nuvolari (2004) of the Cornish steam-engine after 1800. Examples of such cases are not 
many, and they required rather special circumstances that were not common, and collective invention in 
its more extreme form, to judge from its short lifespan, was vulnerable and ephemeral (Mokyr, 2008, p. 
81)   3 
 
 
In contrast, there is growing evidence of recent knowledge sharing that goes well beyond the steel 
mini-mills and open source software. Since the seminal papers by Allen (1983) and von Hippel 
(1987), knowledge sharing activities by competing firms have rapidly developed into one of the 
major themes of the innovation studies literature (see Penin, 2007 and Powell and Giannella, 2010 
for useful surveys). Within this broad literature, an important stream of research has focused, in 
particular, on knowledge sharing by users (Harhoff, Henkel and von Hippel, 2003; von Hippel, 
2005, Shah 2005).  
 
If the nineteenth century saw little knowledge sharing, then it would be important to understand 
why innovation today seems so fundamentally different. On the other hand, perhaps the 
conventional assessment of nineteenth century knowledge sharing is not accurate. Perhaps 
knowledge sharing occurred more frequently and was more important than is generally recognized. 
Indeed, we are aware of numerous examples where the conventional assessment seems misleading. 
For example, textbooks, popular history books and museums typically attribute the rapid growth in 
the productivity of US wheat production to the invention of mechanical threshers, reapers, etc., by 
individual inventors such as Cyrus McCormick. However, recent scholars have found that this 
revolution in productivity would not have been possible without extensive biological innovation 
based on the sharing of knowledge and of seed varieties by farmers (Olmstead and Rhode 2008, 
Chapter 2). 
 
In this chapter we take a second look at the historical evidence concerning knowledge sharing 
activities by competing agents during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. As we shall show, the 
historical record shows clearly that knowledge sharing and free revealing among inventors have 
been historically important sources of innovation. Although the evidence is not sufficient to judge 
whether knowledge sharing occurs more frequently today or not, the evidence shows that it was 
common in the past, notably in some critical technologies. Furthermore, there has long been a 
tension between the depth and scope of open knowledge sharing activities and the operation of 
patent systems.  
 
In this regard, Henkel and von Hippel (2005) argue that one of the most important welfare gains 
stemming from user innovation is linked with greater propensity of users to openly share their 
innovations without claiming intellectual property rights. On this ground, von Hippel (2005) argues 
for a more comprehensive assessment of the welfare effects of intellectual property rights policies. 
The historical evidence on knowledge sharing raises the possibility that patent systems may not be 
the only factor driving innovation. Perhaps a careful reassessment of the historical role of 
knowledge sharing might be a first step toward understanding the relative importance of patents and 
of knowledge sharing institutions in different markets, for different types of technologies, and at 
different phases of the technology life cycle. 
 
2.  KNOWLEDGE SHARING AMONG INVENTORS: SOME HISTORICAL EVIDENCE 
 
In his paper, Allen speculated that ―under the conditions prevailing during the nineteenth century, 
[collective invention] was probably the most important source of inventions‖ (Allen, 1983, p. 21). 
Allen‘s conjecture rests on the idea that, before the establishment of corporate R&D laboratories, in 
many industries inventive activities were carried out as a by-product of investment processes 
without resorting to patent protection. If so, we should expect that, during the nineteenth century, a 
significant number of inventions were not covered by patents.  
 4 
 
Detailed quantitative assessments of the amount of inventive activity undertaken outside the 
coverage of patent protection remain inherently speculative. The appeal of patents for economists 
and economic historians largely stems from the opportunity to study systematically the full universe 
of patented inventions. By contrast, any sensible catalogue of the inventions that remained 
unpatented is likely to be fraught with omissions and related biases, or restricted in long-term 
comparisons. Moser‘s (2005, 2010) research probably provides the best quantitative snapshot of the 
volume of inventive activity undertaken outside the patent system in the mid-nineteenth century. 
Moser examined how many of the inventions put on display at the Crystal Palace exhibition of 1851 
were patented. Only 11.1 percent of the 6,377 British inventions were patented.  
 
One might be tempted to ascribe this remarkably low patent propensity to the high costs and 
cumbersome administrative procedures of the English patent system during the first half of the 
nineteenth century. However, Moser‘s findings are similar for the United States, where the patent 
system was characterized by a smooth application process and low patent fees: only 15.3 percent of 
550 US exhibits were patented. Clearly, Moser‘s findings show that appropriating inventions by 
means of patents was not a major concern for many nineteenth century inventors. But can we also 
assume that the low level of patent propensity estimated by Moser was coupled by knowledge 
sharing among inventors as it assumed in the collective invention model? The answer is that we do 
not know yet. Much research still needs to be done. However, since the publication of Allen‘s 
paper, economic historians and historians of technology have been able to identify several other 
examples of knowledge sharing activities among inventors coupled with limited or no use of patent 
protection. 
 
2.1 Knowledge sharing among inventors in the early modern period 
 
Technical change in the early modern period was mostly the result of the accumulation of 
incremental innovations and improvements. In this historical phase, episodes of major innovations 
credited to specific individual inventors are rare (probably the case of Gutenberg and the printing 
press represents the most significant exception). Epstein has compared technological innovation in 
the early modern period to the invention and transmission of jokes. Jokes typically have no 
recognizable author and they are simply passed on by word of mouth (Epstein, 1998, p. 699). 
Interestingly enough, a certain degree of awareness of the ―collective‖ nature of innovation is 
reflected in the common habit of using the names of localities as eponyms for specific innovations. 
For example, the use of eponyms such as the ―Bolognese‖ silk-throwing machine or the ―Dutch‖ 
loom, etc., suggest an appreciation that these inventions were the product of a community of 
inventors, rather than a single individual.
1 Another revealing example of this awareness is Denis 
Diderot‘s conceptualization of invention. Diderot, noting that inventions emerged from adaptations 
and recombinations of already existing techniques by communities of artisans and technicians, had 
no particular qualms in asserting that individual inventors should be denied exclusive rights on 
innovations (Hilaire-Perez, 2002).    
 
This awareness of the collective nature of innovation processes and of the possible benefits arising 
from knowledge sharing is also revealed by guild regulations concerning the transmission of 
technological knowledge. Today, the resilience of guild systems after 1500 is frequently seen as an 
                                                       
1 The convention of using the names of individual inventors names as eponyms for specific technologies is probably to 
be traced back to the second half of the eighteenth century and is a manifestation of the cultural shift leading to the 
―glorification‖ of the heroic inventor as a national benefactor described by MacLeod (2007). MacLeod (2007) describes 
the British case, but analogous shifts in the public perception of inventors took place in all western countries during the 
nineteenth century.  5 
 
institutional obstacle to the development of new technologies (Mokyr, 1990, pp. 191, 258-60). 
Several scholars have recently challenged this view, especially Epstein who argues that, in a world 
of largely tacit technological knowledge, some features of the guild system, such as apprenticeship 
regulations, were an effective mean of transmitting and consolidating technical skills. Epstein 
contends that the overall contribution of the guild system to technological progress in early modern 
Europe was positive. In fact, the traditionally negative judgment of craft guilds appears to be based 
on a number of documented instances when guilds opposed introducing specific inventions. Epstein 
invites us to be extremely careful in drawing generalizations from these cases (Epstein, 1998; see 
also the essays collected in Epstein and Prak, 2008). In fact, guild regulations and practices, by 
emphasizing the ―collective ownership‖ of skills and technical know-how, actively promoted the 
sharing of technical knowledge in a period when its transmission by other means such as printed 
texts was inherently limited (Epstein, 2004). Since guild inventions took the form of incremental 
improvements and refinements to current processes and products, they tended to be much less 
visible in the historical records (Epstein, 1998, p. 696).  
 
One of the most important inventions emerging from the knowledge sharing activities taking place 
within the guild system is the fluyt. The fluyt was a successful design of sailing ship developed in 
the Netherlands during the sixteenth century. This ship would become the favorite cargo employed 
by the Dutch East India Company during the seventeenth century. In his detailed historical study of 
the Dutch shipcarpenters‘ guilds, Unger (1978, p. 80) found evidence of systematic knowledge 
sharing activities involving technological matters, progressively leading to the design of the fluyt, 
occurring during the several business and social meetings that guild members were required to 
attend.  
 
The emphasis on the collective ownership of the ―trade‖ knowledge could result in opposition to 
patents. Between 1688 and 1718, the London Clockmakers Company lobbied intensively for the 
repeal of specific patents related to their trades. Yet at the same time, a number of important 
innovations in clock and instrument making, such as improved versions of the thermometer and of 
the barometer, were successfully introduced (MacLeod, 1988, pp. 112-113; Turner, 2008). Perez 
has documented in detail the knowledge sharing practices among inventors in the highly successful 
Lyon silk industry. In Lyon, the manufacture of silk was organized by the powerful silk guild of the 
―Grande Fabrique‖.  Intriguingly, Perez has termed these knowledge-sharing practices of the 
Lyonnaise guild system as ―open technique‖ institutions, drawing an explicit parallel with Allen‘s 
―collective invention‖ (Perez, 2008, Foray and Hilaire-Perez, 2006). Notably, the ―open technique‖ 
innovation system of Lyon was able to outcompete London in the production of silk. In London, the 
organization of inventive activities was based on the widespread use of secrecy and patents 
(Cotterau, 1997, pp. 139-143).  
 
Karel Davids (2008, pp. 394-400) argues that free exchange of knowledge among inventors was 
also a common practice among millwrights in the Zaankstreet in the Netherlands, during the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Zankstreet millwrights normally refrained from applying for 
patents (Davids, 2008, p. 408). Hence, according to Davids, the Zankstreet district represented 
another clear-cut case of ―collective invention‖. Again, this type of organization of inventive 
activities yielded high rates of technical progress. The Zaankstreet became one of the cutting-edge 
industrial districts in Europe and was the first place where wind power was adopted on a massive 





2.2  Knowledge sharing among inventors during the Industrial Revolution 
 
Knowledge sharing among inventors also played a role during the Industrial Revolution. The best 
documented case of collective invention during this period is the early development of the high 
pressure steam engine in the Cornish mining district (Nuvolari, 2004; Nuvolari and Verspagen, 
2007). In Cornwall, steam engines were used to pump water out of copper and tin mines. Since coal 
in Cornwall was relatively expensive, the Cornish mining district had been one of the early adopters 
of Boulton and Watt engines that represented the best practice of the time in terms of fuel 
efficiency. Significantly, Watt patented his design for an engine with a separate steam condenser 
with a very broad specification. After Boulton and Watt‘s penetration in the Cornish market, several 
engineers began to develop further improvements, but were frustrated by Boulton and Watt‘s tight 
enforcement of Watt‘s patent (Nuvolari and Verspagen, 2007). The ultimate outcome was a period 
of stagnation in fuel efficiency.  
 
In the wake of this disappointing experience, Cornish steam engineers typically preferred not to 
patent their inventions after Watt‘s patent expired in 1800. Accordingly, the share of Cornish 
patents in steam engineering for the period 1813-1852 fell to under one per cent of the national total 
(Nuvolari, 2004, p. 358). Furthermore, in 1811, Cornish mining engineers and entrepreneurs 
launched a monthly publication containing detailed reports on the performance, technical details 
and operating procedures of the steam engines at work in the county. The explicit intention was 
twofold. First, the publication would permit the rapid identification and diffusion of best-practice 
techniques. Second, it would create a climate of competition and emulation in the Cornish 
engineering community with favorable effects on the rate of technical progress. Joel Lean, a highly 
respected mine "captain" was entrusted with the compilation of the reports and the publication was 
known as Lean's Engine Reporter. It is exactly after the publication of Lean's Engine Reporter that 
Cornwall attained the world technological leadership in steam engineering with the introduction of 
a particularly successful high-pressure condensing engine that would become known as the 
―Cornish‖ engine (Barton, 1969).
2 It can be shown that the systematic comparison of technical 
features, operational procedures and performance of the engines allowed engineers to identify the 
best design configuration, for example in terms of cylinder size, for attaining economies of fuel 
(Nuvolari and Verspagen, 2009). 
 
Although not as systematic as in Cornwall, a similar ethos seems to have pervaded the nascent civil 
engineering profession, which was responsible for many of the innovations in transport. Very little 
of the problem-solving activity that underpinned the engineering of bridges, tunnels, cuttings, 
embankments, etc.—whether for roads, canals or railways—is reflected in the patent records. 
Rather, civil engineers tended to share and publish their solutions, with a view to enhancing their 
professional reputations (MacLeod, 1988, pp. 104-5).  
 
In another recent contribution, Allen suggests that the organization of inventive activities by means 
of collective invention was also characteristic of other technologies developed during the Industrial 
Revolution (Allen, 2009). The first case he mentions is the development of coal-burning houses in 
London during the seventeenth century. Since most of the innovations in this field were 
unpatentable, builders copied and adapted innovations from each other (Allen, 2009, pp. 92-93). 
The second case he describes is the adoption of clover, sainfoin and turnips in crop rotations by 
                                                       
2 Notably, even though specific inventions introduced in Cornwall can be ascribed to individual inventors (eg, the 
tubular boiler to Richard Trevithick, the compound engine design and the double beat valve to Arthur Woolf), the high 
pressure condensing engine would become known as the ―Cornish‖ engine, giving credit to the whole community of 
engineers.  7 
 
open field farmers (Allen, 2009, pp. 68-74). Furthermore, even inventions that originally were 
developed by individual inventors such as James Hargreaves‘ spinning jenny were improved and 
refined by means of collective invention processes. For example, the original spinning jenny had 12 
spindles, but very soon a 24 spindles models were developed for use in cottages and models of 80 
up to 120 spindles for use in workshops. According to Allen (2009b, p. 906): ―[t]hese 
improvements in the jenny were accomplished without patents and were affected by collective 
invention.‖ 
 
Were these examples of knowledge sharing activities a response to the very imperfect English 
patent system of the time? To obtain an English patent, an inventor had to pay expensive fees and 
endure unwieldy administrative procedures. Perhaps if the English patent system were more like its 
American counterpart—with low fees and simple procedures—more English inventors would have 
chosen to appropriate returns using patents. This might have led to less knowledge sharing, but 
perhaps higher levels of private investment in the search for innovations. This interpretation would 
be consistent with the assessment of the US patent system put forward by Khan and Sokoloff 
(1998). According to Khan and Sokoloff (1998), the highly accessible US patent system was a key 
driver of technical change in the nineteenth American economy.  
  
Yet, it would be wrong to assume that collective invention was just a British phenomenon. For 
example, in his account of the development of the high-pressure engine for the western steamboats 
in the United States during the early nineteenth century, Hunter emphasized the significance of 
various flows of incremental innovations (Hunter 1949: 121-80). In the light of the present 
discussion this passage is particularly intriguing:  
 
Though the men who developed the machinery of the western steamboat possessed much ingenuity 
and inventive skill, the record shows that they had little awareness of or use for the patent system. Of 
more than six hundreds patents relating to steam engines issued in this country down to 1847 only 
some forty were taken out in the names of men living in towns and cities of the western rivers. Few 
even of this small number had any practical significance. In view of the marked western preference 
for steam over water power and the extensive development of steam-engine manufacturing in the 
West, these are surprising figures. How is this meager showing to be explained and interpreted ? 
Does it reflect a distaste for patents as a species of monopoly uncongenial to the democratic ways of 
the West, an attitude sharpened by the attempts of Fulton and Evans to collect royalties from 
steamboatmen? Or, were western mechanics so accustomed to think in terms of mere utility that they 
failed to grasp the exploitative possibilities of the products of their ingenuity ? Or, did mechanical 
innovation in this field proceed by such small increments as to present few points which could 
readily be seized upon by a potential patentee ? Perhaps each of these suggestions – and especially 
the last - holds a measure of the truth. At all events the fact remains that, so far as can be determined, 
no significant part of the engine, propelling mechanism, or boilers during the period of the 
steamboat‘s development to maturity was claimed and patented as a distinctive and original 
development (Hunter, 1949, pp. 175-176).  
 
Interestingly, Hunter suggests that the litigation of the patents taken by Robert Fulton and Oliver 
Evans may account for the negative attitude of western mechanics towards patents (Hunter, 1949: 
10, 124-6). At the same time, Hunter is able to document the emergence among western 
steamboatmen and mechanics of a number of rules of thumb in steam boat design and operating 
practices that were continuously refined and improved by means of information exchanges (Hunter, 
1949, pp. 176-180). This steady accumulation of many minor changes and alterations to the design 
of the steamers produced improvements in carrying capacity, increases of speed, reduction of cargo 
collection times, etc., leading to a rate of productivity growth without parallel in the transport 
technology of the period (Mak and Walton, 1972). 8 
 
 
In the United States, knowledge sharing was also important in the development of the critical cotton 
textile industry, one of the harbingers of industrialization. In 1814, Francis Cabot Lowell built the 
first commercially successful power loom in North America with the help of mechanic Paul Moody. 
Lowell patented this loom and his company sold patent rights and also manufactured patent looms. 
But Lowell‘s company made most of its money from producing its own cloth with this technology 
and they discontinued patent licensing and sales after a few years (Gibb 1950).
3 In 1817, William 
Gilmour built the second commercially successful power loom in the US with the assistance of 
David Wilkinson.
4 The design of this loom was more or less freely shared: Wilkinson paid ten 
dollars for Gilmour‘s drawings. Gilmour, Wilkinson, and mechanics trained by Wilkinson engaged 
in the business of building looms under contract to prospective cotton manufacturers (Bagnall 
1893). The rapid diffusion of the power loom owes much to the ―liberal‖ policy of Gilmour and his 
sponsor, Daniel Lyman. Gilmour‘s design proved to be superior to Lowell‘s, replacing it even at the 
mills of Lowell‘s company (Gibb 1950). While patent protection was important for some weaving 
inventions during the Industrial Revolution, such as the loom temple, other key inventions, such as 
the weft fork, were not patented in the US. 
 
Knowledge sharing practices have also been described in other classic historical studies of 
nineteenth century American industries. Judith McGaw‘s (1987) study of paper-making in 
Berkshire, Massachusetts during the nineteenth century documents that paper manufacturers 
engaged in extensive information exchanges concerning machinery to purchase and their possible 
adaptation to specific production tasks. In her interpretation, this knowledge sharing was key to the 
industrial success of the region. Similarly, Anthony F. B. Wallace found evidence of continuous 
free exchanges of information on the solution of technical problems among fellow mechanics and 
machine makers (Wallace, 1978, pp. 211-239).
5  
 
2.3 Knowledge sharing among inventors during the late nineteenth century  
 
Evidence of knowledge sharing does not end with the Industrial Revolution. As noted above, Allen 
(1983) documented the importance of knowledge sharing for the British iron industry in the 
Cleveland district. Thanks to free exchange of information about new techniques and plant designs, 
―fruitful lines of technical advance were identified and pursued‖ (Allen, 1983, p. 2) leading to a 
high and sustained ―rate of invention‖ in the industry. In 1854 Cleveland was producing 275 
thousand tons of iron (about 9 per cent of British production). Less than twenty years later, in 1873, 
Cleveland‘s production had increased to 2 million tons, ie, 30 per cent of British production (Allen, 
1981, p. 37). This increase in output was driven by a sustained stream of inventions that 
revolutionized blast furnace practice in the Cleveland iron district. Remarkably, throughout the 
period 1850-1870, Cleveland engineers claimed very few patents (Allen, 1983, p.2). By and large, 
this stream of inventions was the outcome of systematic knowledge sharing among engineers and 
designers of blast furnaces described by Allen. In the engineering literature of the 1860s and 1870s, 
the blast furnaces of Cleveland were recognized as the world leading technology (Allen, 1981). One 
                                                       
3 By some rough estimates, profits from patent licenses and profits on equipment manufactured and sold by the Boston 
Manufacturing Company comprised only 6% of profits from 1817 to 1823 when these activities were discontinued 
(calculations available from the authors). 
4 Both of these loom designs were based significantly on English designs. Lowell visited English mills and Gilmour had 
been a mechanic at one. However, both inventors took over a year to get their models working and they had to develop 
complementary inventions as well. 
5 In the US case, knowledge sharing activities taking place in networks of mechanics and machine makers are also 
described by Thomson (2009). A particular interesting case described by Thomson is the knowledge sharing activities 
instigated by the US government in the production of firearms during the 1820s and 1830s (Thomson, 2009, pp. 54-59).    9 
 
particularly intriguing contemporary assessment of the Cleveland iron district that was not noted by 
Allen in his original paper is the one provided by Eugène Schneider, one of the managing directors 
of the famous Le Creusot ironworks in France. Schneider, thought that the case of Cleveland clearly 
showed the advantages of organizational set-ups favoring knowledge sharing, rather than individual 
appropriation and protection: 
 
Certain localities have had very restrictive habits in their industries; that is habits of secrecy. In those 
localities, every one hides what is doing, or takes out a patent. The localities in which this spirit 
prevails very seldom advance with great speed. They remain almost always at a very low industrial 
level. The localities, on the other hand, which have a very liberal spirit in matters of invention and in 
matters of patents, advance very rapidly. The entire locality profits greatly by it, and everyone gets 
his share of the advantage…[O]ne of the most remarkable facts in the world is the immense progress 
which has been made by the locality of Middelsboro‘…; 15 years ago, there was scarcely anything 
done there in the iron manufacture. At the present day it is the first district of the world for that 
manufacture, and I have found there is a most liberal spirit, everybody telling his neighbour, 
everybody telling any stranger who has had the honour of being admitted to those great 
manufacturers ―This is what we do‖, ―This is what succeeds with us‖, ―This our invention‖. I have 
told you the result. (Schneider, 1871, p. 133).  
  
Economic historians have pointed to other episodes of knowledge sharing among inventors 
occurring in the later nineteenth century besides Allen‘s case of the Cleveland blast furnaces. 
Kyriazidou and Pesendorfer (1999) suggest that collective invention also characterized the 
Viennese bentwood furniture industry since the 1850s. The industry was highly successful, 
establishing Viennese chairs as a fashion item throughout the world. At the same time, in the field 
of manufacturing processes, Viennese firms pioneered large scale production methods and 
interchangeable parts. According to Kyriaziodou and Pesendorfer, Viennese furniture firms engaged 
in continuous exchanges on information both on new production techniques and new product 
designs: ―…firms were quick to copy the new products of their rivals, and even offered them under 
the same name in their catalogues. As a result, their chairs, which constituted the bulk of industry 
production, came to be known simply as ‗Viennese chairs‘‖ (Kyriazidou and Pesendorfer, 1999, p. 
144). These knowledge exchanges reduced the cost of experimentation at the level of individual 
firms. Firms did take patents, but they did not enforce them against one another, but rather against 
foreign firms (Kyrazidou and Pesendorfer, 1999, p. 158). According to Kyriazidou and Pesendrofer 
the main factor accounting for this pattern of information exchanges was that the continuous 
innovation in manufacturing and product design fuelled rapid growth of industry output, limiting 
the emergence of possible competitive tensions.  
 
Meyer (2003) documents extensive knowledge sharing in US Bessemer steel production. Henry 
Bessemer first patented his process in 1856, but extensive litigation with other inventors delayed the 
implementation of the method until the creation of a patent pool in the US in 1866. However, 
Bessemer‘s process did not work well at first and required substantial improvements. These were 
developed largely by engineering consultants such as Alexander Holley. Meyer documents how 
knowledge was shared through technical publications, by job mobility among engineers and by 
sharing patents and technical know-how among pool members. As a result, the cost of Bessemer 
steel rail fell from $100 per ton in 1870 to $60 per ton in 1880. 
 
These knowledge-sharing activities were not limited to manufacturing. In a recent paper, Moser and 
Rhode (2011) describe the existence of widespread knowledge sharing in the community of 
American hobbyists rose breeders in the early 1900s. These knowledge exchanges were organized 
in the context of the American Rose Society and led to the creation of large number of new rose 10 
 
varieties. Plant varieties were not protected by patents in the US until 1930, for asexual propagation, 
and not until 1970 for sexually propagated varieties. More generally, Olmstead and Rhode (2008) 
have demonstrated highly dynamic biological innovation in nineteenth and early twentieth century 
US agriculture in wheat, cotton, tobacco, alfalfa, corn and livestock. Individual farmers developed 
many of the improvements and they freely shared their varieties and knowledge with others. With 
some crops, such as cotton, farmers organized into cooperatives to coordinate on the best local 
varieties. In later years, government assisted by gathering and diffusing knowledge of best 
practices. Although all this biological innovation is excluded from many accounts of nineteenth 
century innovation, it had very large benefits for social welfare. 
 
Another interesting example of systematic knowledge sharing in the agricultural sector is the case 
of the Danish ―control societies‖ formed by Danish farmers during the 1890s described by Faber 
(1931). This organizational arrangement for knowledge sharing bears a close resemblance with the 
Cornish case of Lean’s Engine Reporter. Membership of the ―control society‖ required the farmers 
to pay a fee. In exchange for this fee, members of the society would receive regular visits from a 
―control assistant‖ monitoring both the quantity and quality of the milk produced by each cow and 
the food she was fed. The data gathered in this way were then published in regular reports.
6 As a 
result, the breeding of cows witnessed major improvements, leading to a rapid increase of yields of 
cows, both in terms of milk production (lbs. of milk per cow) and of the quality of milk (increase in 
the fat content of milk). 
 
Knowledge sharing among inventors was also practiced in developing countries that were trying to 
close their technology gaps and catch up with the world technological frontier. According to 
Saxonhouse (1974) and Otsuka, Ranis and Saxonhouse (1988), this was exactly the case of the 
Japanese cotton spinning industry. In Saxonhouse‘s view, this industry represented ―the first 
completely successful instance of Asian assimilation of western manufacturing techniques‖ 
(Saxonhouse, 1974, p. 150). Over the period 1880-1900, the Japanese cotton industry was capable 
of successfully adopting ring spinning frames coupled with a number of other technical and 
organizational improvements. The exchange of information took place within the institutional 
framework of the All Japanese Cotton Spinners Association (Boren), and in particular of its 
monthly bulletin called Boren Geppo. The journal published detailed production and costs data at 
the plant level. These data permitted systematic comparison across plants and in this way they 
enhance the rapid diffusion of best practices. The journal also published systematic reports on 
innovations developed both in Japan and abroad (Saxonhouse, 1974, p. 160).  
 
Finally, Peter Meyer‘s research has shown that knowledge sharing represented a critical ingredient 
for the invention of the airplane (Meyer, 2011). Throughout the period 1880-1910, a vibrant 
international community of inventors and scientists openly reported and discussed merits and 
limitations of different designs of flying machines in various books, publications and journals. 
Overall, few inventions for heavier-than-air flight were patented during this phase and the main line 
of progress consisted of inventions that were freely shared. This situation changed drastically when 
Wilbur and Orville Wright took their master patent for lateral control in 1906. The success of the 
Wrights‘ experiments marked a sharp turn in the history of the airplane. Lured by the prospect of 
commercial success, many inventors and entrepreneurs entered in this field. In contrast, with the 
behavior of their predecessors, these inventors aggressively patented and asserted their patent rights. 
                                                       
6 The first control society in Denmark was the ―Control Society of Vejen and District‖ created in 1895 (Faber, 1931, p. 
113). Following this highly successful example, from the late 1890s, ―control societies‖ were constituted across the 
entire country. 11 
 
The case of the invention of the airplane shows a stark shift from knowledge sharing to a 
proprietary regime.  
 
3.  WHY SHARE KNOWLEDGE? 
 
Both von Hippel (1987) and Allen (1983) argue that the knowledge sharing activities they 
document are fully consistent with rational individual economic behavior. Allen suggests two 
possible reasons for the disclosure of information in the Cleveland iron district. First, disclosure of 
information about a successful blast furnace design would have enhanced the reputations of the 
designing engineers and of the managers of the firm. This increase in reputation might have well 
offset any possible reduction in profits brought about by the information disclosure. In particular, 
reputational concerns might have been important for the engineers. Blast furnaces were typically 
designed by consulting engineers who moved from firm to firm (Allen, 1983, p. 17). Hence, the 
diffusion of information on the design and performance of different blast furnaces allowed the best 
engineers to signal their talents and to improve their career prospects. The second reason proposed 
by Allen is that the disclosure of information could increase the value of some of the assets owned 
by the revealing party. In the case of Cleveland, blast furnace firms typically also owned ore mines. 
Any improvement in the average performance of the blast furnaces was reflected in an increase of 
the value of the iron ore deposit, possibly making the free revealing of technical information also 
profitable from the point of view of the individual firm (Allen, 1983, p. 17). 
7 
 
Von Hippel‘s interpretation of knowledge sharing activities is more general in scope (von Hippel, 
1987). He focuses on the ―competitive value‖ of the unit of knowledge that is revealed. When the 
competitive advantage offered by the unit of knowledge in question is limited, information 
disclosure will not result in a dangerous competitive backlash for the revealing unit. Furthermore, if 
the behavior is reciprocated this is likely to result in a generalized welfare gain for all firms 
participating in the knowledge exchange (von Hippel, 1987, p. 299). Vice versa, when the unit of 
knowledge in question offers an important competitive advantage vis-à-vis industry rivals, we 
should clearly expect firms refraining from disclosing behavior.  
 
Von Hippel‘s rationale turns the focus of investigation toward understanding what market and 
technology conditions generate the ―soft‖ rivalry that gives rise to knowledge sharing as well as 
what conditions give rise to aggressive rivalry and patenting. Bessen (2011) provides a partial 
answer, suggesting that under some common conditions, as technology matures the nature of firm 
rivalry, firms‘ willingness to share knowledge and their use of patents correspondingly change. In 
particular, knowledge sharing is more likely to occur during the early phases of technology or 
where local innovation has little effect on worldwide prices—factors that appear consistent with 
many of the examples discussed here.  
 
Thus individually rational economic agents might well have good reason to share knowledge just as 
they might have good reason to patent. These choices, however, depend very much on the specific 
circumstances and they make clear that very simple theoretical models of patenting might not 
reflect the richness of actual innovative behav 
                                                       
7 Allen (1983, p. 4) also argues that increases in furnace height or blast temperature, being relatively minor variations of 
existing practices, may not have been patentable. Hence, the actual choice for an inventor in Cleveland might have 
between secrecy and making the information publicly available (Allen, 1983, p. 6). In this respect, perhaps, there is an 
interesting difference between collective invention in Cleveland and in Cornish steam engines. In Cornwall, while 
variations is steam pressure and in cylinder sizes might have not been patentable, other, clearly patentable inventions 
such as the double-beat valve or the Cornish water-gauge (an instrument allowing a prompt monitoring of the level of 
water in the boiler), were not patented, but freely shared (Nuvolari, 2004, p. 359; Pole, 1844, p. 109).  12 
 
 
4.  CONCLUSION  
 
These cases of knowledge sharing among inventors suggest a reappraisal of its role in history. 
Knowledge sharing among innovators in the past was not extremely rare nor was it a marginal 
activity. Although we have not established the full extent of collective invention, it is clear that key 
technologies at the heart of industrialization, such as high-pressure steam engines, iron and steel 
production techniques, steamboats, textile machinery, airplanes, etc., were, at times and places, 
developed through processes of collective invention.  
 
While outstanding individuals also made important contributions in many of these technologies, 
those histories that focus exclusively on ―heroic inventors‖ are misleading and incomplete. The 
story of Cyrus McCormick and his mechanical reaper might be a more compelling narrative than 
the stories of farmers, often nameless, who painstakingly developed and shared new varieties of 
wheat that could be cultivated on the Great Plains. Yet their innovations and knowledge sharing 
were no less important. 
 
Furthermore, these examples make clear that patents are not universally important to innovation. 
Indeed, many of these technologies developed outside the purview of the patent system. In some 
cases, such as with aviation, aggressive patenting put an end to a period of extensive knowledge 
sharing. Yet in other cases, knowledge sharing and patents coexisted, such as the Bessemer patent 
pool or the early mechanics who would freely share patented inventions with other mechanics but 
not with manufacturers (Wallace 1978). In other cases, patents may nevertheless be crucial to 
encouraging innovation. The relationship between innovation, patents and knowledge sharing is a 
subtle and complex one. The optimal policy needs to apply to the full range of market conditions, 
technological maturity, etc., in order to encourage both knowledge sharing and proprietary 
incentives. An unbalanced policy might, for instance, provide strong patent incentives to 
incrementally improve mature technologies but it might also inhibit the development of early stage 
technologies, undermining important new technologies. 
 
More generally, our examples of knowledge sharing suggest a greater continuity between 
innovation in the nineteenth century and today. Today‘s highly innovative open source software 
community and the user innovation communities identified by von Hippel and his associates (von 
Hippel 2005, Shah 2005) may have much in common with previous generations of innovators in the 
way they share knowledge. Moreover, the history of knowledge sharing may be a particularly good 
source for understanding a richer picture of the institutions and incentives that shape innovation 







5.  REFERENCES 
 
Allen, R. C. (1981), ‗Entrepreneurship and technical progress in the northeast coast pig iron 
industry: 1850-1913‘, Research in Economic History, 6: 35-71. 
 
Allen, R. C. (1983), ‗Collective invention‘, Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization, 4: 1-
24. 
 
Allen, R. C. (2009), The British Industrial Revolution in Global Perspective, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.  
 
Allen, R. C. (2009b), ‗The industrial revolution in miniature: the spinning jenny in Britain, France 
and India‘, Journal of Economic History, 69: 901-927.  
 
Allen, T.J., Hyman, D.B. and Pinckney, D. L. (1983), ‗Transferring technology to the small 
manufacturing firms. A study of technology transfer in three countries‘, Research Policy, 12, 199-
211. 
 
Bagnall, William R. (1893), The textile industries of the United States: including sketches and 
notices of cotton, woolen, silk, and linen manufacturers in the colonial period, Volume 1, 
Cambridge: The Riverside Press. 
 
Barton, D. B. (1969), The Cornish Beam Engine, Truro: D.B. Barton 
 
Bessen, J. (2011), ‗The Two Faces of Innovation,‘ Boston University School of Law Working 
Paper 10-35 (previously titled ‗Communicating Technical Knowledge‘), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1698802, 
 
Chesbrough, Henry (2003), Open Innovation: The New Imperative for Creating and Profiting from 
Technology, Boston: Harvard Business School Press. 
 
Cotterau, A. (1997). ‗The fate of collective manufactures in the industrial world: the silk industries 
of Lyons and London,1800-1850‘ in Sabel, C. and Zeitlin, J. (eds.), Worlds of Possibilities, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Davids, K. (2008), The Rise and Decline of Dutch Technological Leadership. Technology, Economy 
and Culture in the Netherlands, 1350-1800. Vol. I and II, Leiden: Brill.  
 
Epstein, S. (1998), ‗Craft guilds, apprenticeship and technical change in preindustrial Europe‘, 
Journal of Economic History, 58: 684-713.  
 
Epstein, S. (2004), ‗Property rights to technical knowledge in premodern Europe, 1300-1800‘, 
American Economic Review, 94: 382-387.  
 
Epstein, S and Prak, M. (eds.) (2008), Guilds, Innovation and the European Economy, 1400-1800, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Faber, H. (1931), Co-operation in Danish Agriculture, London, Longmans. 
 14 
 
Foray, D. and Hilaire-Perez, L. (2006), ‗The economics of open technology: collective organisation 
and individual claims in the ―fabrique lyonnaise‖ during the Old Regime‘ in Antonelli, C. et al. 
(eds.), New Frontiers in the Economics of Innovation and New Technology, Aldershot: Edward 
Elgar.  
 
Gibb, George S. (1950), The Saco-Lowell Shops. Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press. 
 
Harhoff, D. Henkel, J. and von Hippel, E. (2003), ‗Profiting from voluntary information spillovers: 
how users benefit from free revealing their innovations‘, Research Policy, 32, 1753-1769.  
 
Henkel, J and von Hippel, E. (2005), ‗Welfare implications of user innovation‘, Journal of 
Technology Transfer, 30, 73-87.  
 
Hilaire-Perez, L. (2002), ‗Diderot‘s views on artists‘ and inventors‘ rights: invention, imitation and 
reputation‘, British Journal for the History of Science, 35: 129-150.  
 
Hunter, L. C. (1949), Steamboats on the Western Rivers. An Economic and Technological History, 
Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press 
 
Khan, B. Z. and Sokoloff, K. L. (1998), ―Patent Institutions, Industrial Organization and Early 
Technological Change: Britain and the United States, 1790-1850‖, in Berg M. and K. Bruland 
(eds.), Technological Revolutions in Europe, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.  
 
Kyriazidou, E. and Pesendorfer, M. (1999), ‗Viennese chairs: a case study for modern 
industrialization‘, Journal of Economic History, 59:143-165.  
 
MacLeod, C. (1988), Inventing the Industrial Revolution. The English Patent System, 1660-1800, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 
MacLeod, C. (2007), Heroes of Invention: Technology, Liberalism and British Identity, 1750-1914, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Mak, J. and Walton, G. M. (1972), ‗Steamboats and the great productivity surge in river 
transportation‘, Journal of Economic History, 32: 619-640.  
 
McGaw, J. A. (1987), Most Wonderful Machine. Mechanization and Social Change in Berkshire 
Paper Making, 1801-1885, Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
 
Meyer, P. (2003), ‗Episodes of Collective Invention‘, US Bureau of Labor Statistics Working Paper 
368.  
 
Meyer, P. (2011), ‗Open sources in the invention of the airplane‘, Working Paper. 
 
Mokyr, J. (1990), The Lever of Riches. Technological Creativity and Economic Progress, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.  
 
Mokyr, J. (2008), ‗The institutional origins of the industrial revolution‘ in Helpman, E. (ed.), 
Institutions and Economic Performance, Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press.  
 15 
 
Mokyr, J. (2009), The Enlightened Economy. An Economic History of Britain, 1700-1850, New 
Haven: Yale University Press.  
 
Moser, P. (2005), ‗How do patent laws influence innovation ? Evidence from nineteenth century 
world‘s fairs‘, American Economic Review, 95: 1214-1236.  
 
Moser, P. (2010), ‗Innovation without patents. Evidence from world fairs‘, Working Paper, 
Stanford University.  
 
Moser, P. and Rhode, P. (2011), ‗Did plant patents create the America rose ?‘, Working Paper, 
Stanford University.  
 
Nuvolari, A. (2004), ‗Collective invention during the British industrial revolution: the case of the 
Cornish pumping engine‘, Cambridge Journal of Economics, 28, 347-363.  
 
Nuvolari, A. and Verspagen, B. (2007), ‗Lean’s Engine Reporter and the development of the 
Cornish engine: a reappraisal‘, Transactions of the Newcomen Society, 77: 167-189. 
 
Nuvolari, A. and Verspagen, B. (2009), ‗Technical choice, innovation and British steam 
engineering, 1800-1850‘, Economic History Review, 62: 685-710.  
 
Olmstead, Alan L. and Paul W. Rhode (2008), Creating Abundance: Biological Innovation and 
American Agricultural Development, New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Otsuka, K., Ranis, G. and Saxonhouse, G. (1988), Comparative Technical Choice in Development: 
the Indian and Japanese Cotton Textile Industries, New York: St. Martin‘s Press.  
 
Pole, W. (1844), A Treatise on the Cornish Pumping Engine, London: Weale. 
 
Penin, J. (2007), ‗Open knowledge disclosure: an overview of the evidence and motivations‘, 
Journal of Economic Surveys, 326-348.  
 
Perez, L. (2008), ‗Inventing in a world of guilds: silk fabrics in eighteenth-century Lyon‘ in 
Epstein, S and Prak, M. (eds.) (2008), Guilds, Innovation and the European Economy, 1400-1800, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 232-263.  
 
Powell, W. and Giannella, E. (2010), ‗Collective invention and inventor networks‘ in Hall, B. and 
Rosenberg, N. (eds.), Handbook of Economics of Innovation, Vol. I, Amstersam: Elsevier: 575-605.  
 
Saxonhouse, G. (1974), ‗A tale of Japanese technological diffusion during the Meiji period‘, 
Journal of Economic History, 34: 149-165.  
 
Schneider, E. (1871), ‗Evidence‘ in Select Committee on Law and Practice of Grants of Letters 
Patent for Invention, P.P., 1871, 368 (X).  
 
Schrader, S. (1991), ‗Informal technology transfer between firms: Cooperation through information 
trading,‘ Research Policy, 20:153-70. 16 
 
 
Shah, S. K. (2005), ‗Open beyond software‘, in C. Di Bona, D. Cooper, and M. Stone (eds), Open 
Sources 2, Sebastopol: O‘ Reilly. 
 
Thomson, R. (2009), Structures of Change in the Mechanical Age. Technological Innovation in the 
United States, 1790-1865, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.  
 
Turner, A. (2008), ‗ ―Not to hurt of trade‖: guilds and innovation in horology and precision 
instrument maker‘ in Epstein, S and Prak, M. (eds.) (2008), Guilds, Innovation and the European 
Economy, 1400-1800, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 264-287.  
 
Unger, R. W. (1978), Dutch Shipbuilding before 1800, Assen: Van Gorcum.  
 
von Hippel, E. (1987), ‗Cooperation between rivals: informal know-how trading‘, Research Policy, 
16: 291-302.  
 
von Hippel, E. (2005), Democratizing Innovation, Cambridge (Mass.): MIT Press.  
 
Wallace, A. F. (1978), Rockdale: The Growth of an America Village in the Early Industrial 
Revolution, Knopf: New York.  
 